Today (17 November 2026), we were offered the opportunity by a judge in a Family Law trial to adduce extra evidence due to a recent change in case law. This is because Cannon & Moore [2026] FedCFamC1A 206 was delivered on 13 November 2026. Many other lawyers and clients will be in the same position.
Luckily our evidence was already sufficient and there are no extra legal fees required for our client who had already given evidence about the family violence she suffered, and importantly, also evidence of the effect of the violence causing fear and coercion.
Cannon & Moore concerns the assessment of family violence in parenting proceedings. A five-judge Full Court, including the Chief Justice and other highly respected judges, clarified the definition of family violence. Namely, that section 4AB requires both:
- Relevant behaviour; and
- That the behaviour must either:
- Coerce or control a family member; or
- Cause fear
Simply identifying objectionable behaviour alone is insufficient. In departing from aspects of previous case law, the Court endorsed structured fact-finding and criticised broad findings that failed to resolve disputed allegations individually. Intention to cause the effect is unnecessary, but a person’s description of their experience does not itself determine the legal conclusion.
The practical implication for lawyers is to present evidence connecting conduct with its effects. Affidavits should explain what happened, when it happened, the surrounding circumstances, and how the person’s choices, access to money, movements or sense of safety were affected. Specific examples, contemporaneous messages, financial records and witnesses may strengthen that connection.
For example, evidence that someone withheld money should explain whether this prevented essential purchases, compelled compliance or created fear, rather than simply labelling it “financial abuse”.
Lawyers should also identify the findings sought on each material allegation and address cumulative patterns. Conduct falling outside section 4AB may nevertheless remain relevant to children’s best interests. These drafting implications are my inference from the Court’s reasoning.